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2Institute for Research in Economic Evolution, University of Freiburg
Abstract. We present a new dynamic bank run model for liquidity risk where a financial
institution finances its risky assets by a mixture of short- and long-term debt. The financial
institution is exposed to insolvency risk at any time until maturity and to illiquidity risk at a
finite number of rollover dates. We compute both insolvency and illiquidity default
probabilities in this multiperiod setting using a structural credit risk model approach.
Firesale rates can be determined endogenously as expected debt value over current asset
value. Numerical results illustrate the impact of various input parameters on the default
probabilities.
JEL Classification: G01, G32, G33
1. Introduction
The credit crisis of 2007–08 has dramatically shown that credit risk not only
reduced insolvency risk but also intertwined with liquidity aspects. In par-
ticular, debt runs are mentioned as one of the main reasons for the crisis, for
example, in Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2008). The failures of
Northern Rock and DSB bank are just two examples of bankruptcies due
* This work was supported by the Excellence Initiative through the project “Pricing of
Risk in Incomplete Markets” within the Institutional Strategy of the University of Freiburg
and by the Oxford-Man Institute. The financial support is gratefully acknowledged by the
authors. We thank an anonymous referee and Steven Ongena, Co-Editor of the Review of
Finance, for valued inputs that significantly improved our paper. We are very grateful to
Stefan Klein from Credit Suisse for supplying the data on leverage for the high-yield market
as reported by Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. Several helpful comments and suggestions
from Sebastian Ebert are very much appreciated. We also thank the participants at the
Modeling and Managing Financial Risks conference in Paris 2011, the Actuarial and
Financial Mathematics conference 2011 in Brussels, the 11th Conference of the Society for
the Advancement of Economic Theory in Faro 2011, and the ICIAM conference 2011 in
Vancouver, as well as seminar participants at the Universities of Oxford and Freiburg for
several insightful remarks.
 The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association].
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
 Review of Finance Advance Access published June 22, 2013
 at B
odleian Library on July 6, 2013
http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
to a run by short-term creditors. After approaching the Bank of England for
a liquidity support facility, Northern Rock was the first bank to fail from a
bank run during the credit crisis in 2007. As their funding problems were
made public, depositors had withdrawn their savings as quickly as possible.
As a result, the bank failed due to this panic run.1 Similarly, the Dutch DSB
bank suffered from a run by depositors, who had withdrawn E600 million in
12 days, corresponding to about a quarter of the bank’s assets. The bank was
placed under supervision of De Nederlandsche Bank in October 2009, and
afterward was declared bankrupt.2 Furthermore, the failures of Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers were partly due to a run by short-term creditors. Both
institutions had capital cushions well above the Basel II minimal capital
requirements, but had financed their long-duration risky assets mostly
through short-term debt. Thereby, they were heavily exposed to liquidity
risk. In fact, Christopher Cox (2008), then chairman of the US Securities
and Exchange Commission, explained in an open letter, “[. . .]the fate of Bear
Stearns was the result of a lack of confidence, not a lack of capital.
[. . .]Counterparty withdrawals and credit denials, resulting in a loss of li-
quidity - not inadequate capital - caused Bear’s demise.”3
It is now understood that short–duration financing, for example, through
commercial papers and repo transactions, increases the exposure to panic
runs that were among the main causes of the credit crisis of 2007–08. In fact,
it has been shown in Adrian and Shin (2008, 2010) that the use of very short-
term financing dramatically increased during the financial crisis of 2007–08
and the period immediately before that.
In this article, we are concerned with the following set of questions. What
is the contribution of liquidity risk to a firm’s total default risk? How do
fluctuations in the firm fundamentals impact the rollover decision of short-
term creditors, and thus total default risk? How does the default probability
of a financial institution depend on its financing structure, that is, on the
ratio of short-term debt over total debt, and on the maturity structure or
rollover frequency of short-term debt?
To answer these questions, we construct a structural credit risk model in
continuous time with multiple rollover dates for short-term funding. More
specifically, we consider a financial institution financing its risky assets using
short- and long-term debt. Short-term debt earns lower return than long-
term debt, but the short-term creditors of the financial institution have the
choice not to renew their funding at certain rollover dates. We do not use a
1 For more details, we refer to Shin (2009).
2 See the BBC report by Paul Lewis dated November 7 2009.
3 See also Morris and Shin (2009).
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staggered debt structure as in He and Xiong (2012b), who solve for the
unique threshold equilibrium, that is, they endogenously determine the
unique threshold value such that each maturing creditor would decide to
run on the firm if the asset value falls below this threshold. Instead, we
extend the existing static bank run models to a multiperiod setting. This
multiperiod structure is important for practical applications as banks
usually finance themselves by a combination of repo transactions, commer-
cial papers, and very short-duration contracts with high rollover frequencies.
Thus, the decision of other creditors maturing at the same time can have a
dramatic impact on the current default risk. Our model provides a method to
analyze this effect. In this way, our multiperiod model extends the game-
theoretic approach of Morris and Shin (2009), who propose a two-period
model with only one rollover decision, toward real-life applications.
The decision of a short-term creditor, whether to roll over or not, obvi-
ously depends on the default probability of the financial institution. The
financial institution is exposed to both insolvency risk and illiquidity risk.
Insolvency risk is defined as the risk of deterioration in the credit quality of
some investments resulting in unexpected losses. In contrast, we define illi-
quidity risk as the risk of a default due to a run by short-term creditors,
although it would otherwise have been solvent. In case several short-term
creditors choose not to roll over their funding, the value of the available
liquid assets might not be sufficient to pay off short-term creditors, leading
to a default due to illiquidity of the financial institution. In particular, this
means that the rollover decisions of short-term creditors today will not only
depend on their expectations about the rollover behavior of other creditors
today (as in the static bank run models) but also on their expectations about
possible bank runs at future decision dates. Thus, our model represents a
fully dynamic coordination problem or rollover game between short-term
creditors. In this way, it allows us to study how both future aggregate
rollover risk and future insolvency risk affect the current decision of short-
term creditors, and thus today’s default probability. Hence, our model
provides an appropriate setting to answer the above questions.
To explicitly compute the total default probability of the financial insti-
tution, we use a 1st-passage time approach. Insolvency happens at the
1st-passage time when the asset value process falls below an insolvency
barrier, which depends on the firm’s capital structure. We calculate the
total default probability by first specifying a bank run barrier. When the
asset value at a rollover date falls below this barrier, short-term creditors
will decide to run on the financial institution. Note that this does not neces-
sarily lead to a default of the financial institution as the latter might be able
to payoff short-term creditors. To determine the bank run barrier, we
AMULTIPERIODBANKRUNMODELFORLIQUIDITYRISK 3
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compare the expected future return from rolling over with the expected
return from running on the financial institution at each decision date. As
both depend on the future rollover decisions, we have to proceed backward
in time to solve this optimization problem. Moreover, we define an illiquidity
barrier at each rollover date as the critical asset value when a successful run
occurs, that is, a run that leads to the default of the financial institution. The
total default probability can then be computed as the probability that the
asset value falls below the insolvency barrier at any time until maturity, or in
case of a bank run, by the probability that the firm is not able to buffer the
losses connected with paying off short-term debt at some rollover date. The
insolvency default probability can be computed analytically as in the clas-
sical Black and Cox (1976) model. The difference between total default
probability and insolvency default probability then defines the illiquidity
default probability.
Due to the dynamic coordination problem between short-term creditors,
we cannot compute the total default probability by simple analytical
formulas as in the classical 1st-passage time model of Black and Cox
(1976). Instead, we implement our model in a binomial tree framework.
We present numerical results showing that illiquidity risk is increasing in
the volatility of the risky assets and in the market return rate. These results
extend the qualitative observations in Morris and Shin (2009) and comple-
ment results in the recent paper of Huang and Ratnovski (2011). The latter
show that short-term creditors are easily inveigled by negative public signals
to withdraw their funding, and thus can trigger inefficient liquidations.
A main empirical implication of our model is that total default risk is
increasing in the rollover frequency and in the short-term debt ratio, that
is, in the ratio of short-term debt over total debt. This is due to the fact that
bank runs become more likely when there are more possibilities to run on the
firm. Moreover, a bank run is more likely to trigger a default when more
short-term debt has to be paid off. In this way, our article supports the
results in Brunnermeier and Oehmke (forthcoming) and Adrian and Shin
(2008, 2010) who show that excessive reliance on short-term financing results
in unnecessary rollover risk and inefficient debt runs. Recently, Acharya,
Gale, and Yorulmazer (forthcoming) showed that rollover risk is indeed an
important factor in the capital structure, especially for those financial insti-
tutions with heavy maturity mismatch. Their results imply that debt capacity
is lower when short-term debt is more frequently rolled over. The implica-
tions of our model support these findings. Moreover, the decomposition of
the total default probability in its insolvency and illiquidity components, as
presented in our article, can also provide new insight into the optimal capital
structure.
4 G. LIANGETAL.
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The firesale rate is one of two important variables that mainly determine
the size of illiquidity risk in our model. It represents the rate by which
the risky asset can be sold prematurely (or equivalently, the cash that can
be borrowed by pledging one unit of risky asset as collateral). The
firesale rate can be implicitly determined from the leverage and has been
proved to be time varying. In our model, the firesale rate can be
defined endogenously at each rollover date as the ratio of the expected
debt value over the asset value. By this definition, not only the uncertainty
of the fundamental (i.e., the asset value) but also the future rollover risk and
insolvency risk, implicitly captured in the expected debt value, are channeled
into the firesale rate. It has been suggested that besides interest rates, lever-
age (and thereby, firesale rates) can also be used as monetary policy
tools (see, e.g., Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen 2010; Morris and
Shin, 2009; and Geanakoplos, 2009). When liquidity is tight, central banks
should not only take care of lowering interest rates but also provide lending
with more generous haircut to enhance liquidity in the market. Our empirical
results show that the total default probability is decreasing when firesale
rates (and thus, leverage) are increasing. Hence, the predictions of our
model imply that in terms of regulation on firm level, as also suggested in
Morris and Shin (2009), the single-minded focus on capital requirements
needs to give way to a broader range of balance sheet indicators, including
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets and short-term liabilities to total
liabilities.
Our article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model
setup, our main assumptions, and explain how the insolvency and illiquidity
barriers can be derived. Here, we also state our main theoretical result about
the existence and uniqueness of a bank run barrier in Theorem 1. Moreover,
we present the decomposition of the total default probability in its insolv-
ency and illiquidity components in Theorem 2. We explain how our model
can be empirically tested and provide a sensitivity analysis to study the
impact of various input parameters on the default probabilities in Section
3. Here, we also discuss the main empirical prediction of our model. Section
4 discusses the endogenous derivation of firesale rates, competitions among
banks, and further extensions of our model, as well as the related literature.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes. The proofs of our
theoretical results are provided in Appendix A. We provide an online
supplement that covers an analytical characterization of the default
probabilities in terms of the solutions of partial differential equation
Dirichlet problems as well as a detailed explanation of how our model can
numerically be implemented using binomial tree methods.
AMULTIPERIODBANKRUNMODELFORLIQUIDITYRISK 5
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2. Multiperiod Bank Run Model
2.1 FINANCING STRUCTURE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Suppose a financial institution finances its risky assets, such as loans or risky
securities, by short- and long-term debt. We model the value process
ðVðtÞÞt0 of the risky assets by a geometric Brownian motion
VðtÞ ¼ V0  exp  1
2
2
 
tþ Wt
 
ð1Þ
with drift  and volatility  > 0, where ðWtÞt0 is a standard Brownian
motion representing random shocks to the asset value. We further assume
that the financial institution also holds a cash amount M on the asset side,
which is invested at the (continuously compounded) risk-free rate r.
2.1.a Long- and short-term debt
We now turn to the liabilities side of the financial institution. At time t0 ¼ 0,
long-term creditors invest an amount L0 until time T. The promised (con-
tinuously compounded) rate of return for long-term debt is rL per annum.
Thus, if there is no default, the value of long-term debt at maturity is
LT ¼ erLTL0:
At initiation time t0 ¼ 0, short-term creditors invest an amount S0 at the
(continuously compounded annual) rate rS. Assume that short-term cred-
itors can decide whether they want to renew their funding or not at n – 1
rollover dates t1, . . . , tn1.4 Let tn ¼ T be the final maturity of short-term
debt. For simplicity, we assume the rollover dates to be equidistant, such
that t ¼ T=n can be understood as the rollover frequency of short-term
debt. The short-term rate rS is fixed at the beginning of the debt contract in
t0 and is assumed to be constant for all time periods ½ti, tiþ1. If some short-
term creditors decide not to renew their funding, the financial institution will
sell the corresponding short-term bonds to new creditors, if it does not
default due to a bank run at that time point. If not too many short-term
creditors decide to run away, the financial institution should always be able
to find some new creditors in the market. Note that by this assumption, the
face value of short-term debt at any time ti is known in advance.
4 We will discuss the generalization to a continuous time setting, where short-term creditors
can run at any time t 2 ½0,T, in Section 4.
6 G. LIANGETAL.
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Remark 1
One can easily extend our model to the case where rS is a deterministic function
of time. Taking into account stochastic fluctuations of the short-term rate,
however, would complicate the numerical solution to our model consider-
ably. Instead of the single Brownian term driving the asset value process, we
would then have to consider an additional stochastic factor driving the
short-term rate. One can in principle implement such a setting in a two-
dimensional binomial tree framework. However, for the message of this
article, we think this would not lead to any substantial new insights.
Notation 1
To simplify notations, we will, in the following, denote all parameters at time ti
only by the subindex i, for example, Vi ¼ VðtiÞ.
If short-term debt is rolled over at time ti, that is, if the face value Si is
invested a new until time tiþ1, then the face value of short-term debt at time
tiþ1 is
Siþ1 ¼ erStSi ¼ erSðiþ1ÞtS0:
The rollover decision of each short-term creditor surely depends on her
beliefs whether the firm will survive a bank run or not, that is, on the like-
lihood that she will get her face value of debt back. This likelihood clearly
depends on the funds that can be raised. At time ti < T, the risky assets can
be liquidated prematurely only at a firesale price. We denote by  i 2 ½0, 1
the firesale rate representing the cash that can be borrowed by pledging one
unit of risky asset as collateral.5 The value of the cash amount at time ti is
given by ertiM. Intuitively, the ratio between the funds that can be raised at
time ti and the principle of short-term debt
 iVi þ ertiM
Si
ð2Þ
represents the likelihood that the short-term creditors get back their face
value of the debt. The higher the value of Equation (2), the more funds
the firm can raise, and the more likely the short-term creditors are to get
their debt back. Because the creditors at most get their debt back, the above
ratio needs to be cut off at 1. Hence,
i ¼ min 1,  iVi þ e
rtiM
Si
 
ð3Þ
5 We will discuss in Subsection 4.1 how the firesale rate can be endogenously determined in
our model.
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can be interpreted as the survival probability from a bank run. Here, we
implicitly assume that there are sufficiently many creditors such that the
individual rollover decision only affects the survival probability from a
bank run at time ti by a negligible small amount.
The decision at time ti (i ¼ 1, . . . , n 1) of short-term creditors to rollover
or not of course also depends on the return they can earn in the outside
market. We assume the (continuously compounded annual) outside rate r
to be constant for all time periods. It is a variable assumed to be known and
given in the market. For our model to be meaningful, we assume the outside
return to be strictly smaller than the short-term debt rate. Otherwise, short-
term creditors would directly choose the outside option instead of investing
their debt at the risky rate rS.
Finally, we assume that short-term debt holders who decide not to
roll over at some time point ti, where no successful run occurs, cannot
return to the financial institution at a later time point tj > ti. Without
this assumption, short-term creditors would just switch from the financial
institution to the outside option and back, depending on whether the
market rate r or the short-term rate rS is higher, in which case our model
would reduce to a two-period model. It can, however, be argued that, when a
short-term creditor decides not to roll over her debt at a certain time point,
she should be able to return to the bank only under different conditions, that
is, for a different short-term rate ~rS 6¼ rS. Incorporating this feature in our
model is beyond the scope of this article as we will discuss in Remark 2
below.
Remark 2
Superposition of bank run models. In real life, one is faced with a super-
position of processes of the type we are explaining here. Namely, at each
date ti, one can observe new data for rS, i, r

i , etc., which reflect the
current market situation, and which influence the rollover decision of
short-term creditors as well as the investment decisions of new debt
holders. If ri > rS, i1 at a decision date ti, short-term creditors will run
on the financial institutions. To avoid this, the financial institution has to
offer a new short-term rate rS, i > r
 at each decision date ti for
i ¼ 1, . . . , n 1, to keep its creditors. The financial institution, therefore,
always needs to be able to buffer losses of size eðrS, ir
ÞðniÞt. Hence, at
each decision date ti, one actually faces a new multiperiod rollover
problem of the type discussed in this article with data adjusted to the
specified date. When incorporating this feature in our model, the compu-
tation of the expected returns from rolling over and from running on the
firm would be formidably complex. It might be possible in principle;
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however, in our view, this would complicate our model considerably by
adding only very little new insight.6
We summarize our assumptions on short-term creditors as follows.
Assumption 1
(a) Short-term creditors can only decide whether to roll over their funding or
not at dates t1, t2, . . . , tn1, and short-term debt can only be rolled over
until the next decision date.
(b) Each short-term creditor believes that the firm will survive a bank run
with probability
i ¼ min 1,  iVi þ e
rtiM
Si
 
,
where  i 2 ½0, 1 is the firesale rate at time ti.
(c) The outside return rate r is strictly smaller than the short-term debt
rate rS.
(d) Short-term debt holders who decide not to roll over at some time point ti,
where no successful run occurs, cannot return to the financial institution
at a later time point tj > ti.
For simplicity of derivations, we further assume zero recovery rate in case
of a default. Note, however, that our results can also be derived with
nonzero recovery by a straightforward extension of our arguments.
Assumption 2
The recovery rate is zero.
2.1.b Balance sheet before and after a run
We will now explain how a bank run affects the balance sheet decomposition
of the financial institution. The balance sheet at any time t 2 ðti1, ti before a
run occurs is demonstrated in Table I below.
Suppose now that there is a bank run at time ti but the firm is still solvent.
Then the firm is forced to pledge a fraction i of its assets as collateral at the
firesale price i iVi to some lending banks in order to pay off Si to short-
term creditors, that is, i is chosen such that
Si ¼ i iVi þ ertiM:
The remaining ð1 iÞ risky assets are kept on the balance sheet. We denote
by rc the rate at which funds i iVi can be raised. The rate rc must be
6 Compare also Remark 1 for a related issue, which similarly applies to the outside rate r.
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understood as the interest rate at which banks are willing to lend money to
the firm as emergency funding, that is, in a distressed state, until maturity T.
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that rc > rL as the collateralized debt
can also be understood as long-term debt. As for rS and r
, we assume rc to
be constant for all decision dates t1, . . . , tn1. Thus, the balance sheet
changes after the bank run as illustrated in Table II below. The total cash
amount i iVi þ ertiM that can be raised at time ti is used to pay off short-
term debt. Thus, there is no more cash left on the asset side of the balance
sheet. Instead, the firm holds ð1 iÞVðtÞ risky assets at time t. Moreover, the
firm has the opportunity to receive the risky assets iVðTÞ at maturity if it is
able to pay off collateralized debt at time T. On the liabilities side, the firm
has issued long-term debt with maturity T and face value LT. Moreover, it
has to payoff the collateralized debt, that is, it has to pay off
i iVi  ercðTtiÞ ¼ Si  ertiMð ÞercðTtiÞ to receive the risky assets. Otherwise,
the lending banks will keep the risky assets iVðTÞ at maturity T.
2.2 COMPUTATION OF DEFAULT BARRIERS
2.2.a Insolvency barrier
We now turn to the computation of default barriers in the above setting.
Similar to Black and Cox (1976), the financial institution’s default due to
insolvency at any time t 2 ½0,T is determined by the time-varying insolvency
barrier
ðtÞ ¼ erðTtÞ S0erST þ L0erLT MerT
   , ð4Þ
Table I. Balance sheet at time t 2 ðti1, ti before a bank run
The table illustrates the balance sheet decomposition at any time t 2 ðti1, ti before a bank
run has occurred. The firm holds risky assets V(t) and cash ertM on the asset side. On the
liabilities side, the firm holds long-term debt with face value LT and maturity T and short-
term debt with face value Si that can be rolled over at dates ti < . . . < tn1 until final
maturity T. Cash is invested at the risk-free rate r. Long- and short-term debt pays a
return rL and rS, respectively.
Assets Liabilities
Risky assets with market value V(t)
and maturity T
Long-term debt with maturity T
and face value LT
Cash ertM that is invested
in the risk-free rate r
Short-term debt with maturity ti and face
value Si that can be rolled over at dates ti, . . . , tn1
until final maturity T
10 G. LIANGETAL.
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with  2 ½0, 1 being a safety covenant that determines how much of the asset
value is available to compensate creditors and equity holders, according to a
predescribed seniority when the firm bankrupts.
2.2.b Bank run barrier at time tn1
In the computation of the bank run barrier, we are motivated by an idea in
Morris and Shin (2009). At each rollover date, the short-term creditors face a
binary decision problem. They have to decide whether they rollover their
debt or not, depending on the corresponding expected returns from both
decisions. Hence, we need to determine the critical asset value at each
rollover date at which short-term creditors decide not to roll over their
funding. We call this value the bank run barrier at time ti, and denote it by
i. For its computation, we proceed backward, starting with the final
rollover date tn1, because the default probability at later dates will influence
the rollover decision at early dates. Hence, for the terminal time period
½tn1,T, we consider the expected returns from rolling over and from the
outside option. We use Rn1 to denote the expected outside return short-
term creditors earn at tn by investing in the market if they decide not to roll
over their debt at time tn1. Recall that the market rate is denoted by r. The
expected outside return at time tn1 is given by the product of the market
return and the survival probability from a bank run
eR

n1t ¼ ert  n1, ð5Þ
as the short-term debt is paid back (such that it then can be invested in the
market) only if the firm has survived from a bank run. Due to Assumption 2,
Table II. Balance sheet at time t 2 ðti,T after a bank run at time ti
The table illustrates the balance sheet decomposition at time t 2 ðti,T after a bank run at
time ti. At maturity, the firm has to pay off long-term debt LT. Moreover, it has to pay off
the collateralized debt i iVi  ercðTtiÞ, where rc is the interest rate at which the collateralized
debt has been raised at time ti, and  i is the firesale rate at time ti. When paying off
collateralized debt, the firm receives the risky assets iVðTÞ. Otherwise, the lending banks
will keep the risky assets iVT as collateral. There is no cash left on the balance sheet as it
has been used to pay off short-term creditors at time ti.
Assets Liabilities
Risky assets ð1 iÞVðtÞ Long-term debt with maturity T
and face value LT
Option to receive risky assets iVðTÞ
at time T when paying off collateralized debt
Collateralized debt i iVie
rcðttiÞ with maturity T
AMULTIPERIODBANKRUNMODELFORLIQUIDITYRISK 11
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short-term creditors get nothing in case of a default. Hence, the expected
outside return rate Rn1 at time tn1 is defined as
Rn1 ¼ r þ
ln n1
t
: ð6Þ
If the short-term creditor decides to roll over her debt at time tn1, she
earns rS at time tn provided that the firm does not default due to insolvency
in ðtn1, tn, or due to a bank run at time tn1. Thus, the expected return from
rolling over at time tn1 is given by the product of the short-term debt return,
the survival probability from insolvency within the time period ðtn1, tn, and
the survival probability from a bank run at tn1, that is,
eR
S
n1t ¼ erSt  P inf
tn1<stn
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0Vn1
 
 n1: ð7Þ
Note that we did not multiply the right-hand side (RHS) of Equations (5)
and (7) by the survival probability from insolvency at time tn1 because in
case of an insolvency default at tn1, there is no decision to be made for
short-term creditors as they loose their debt anyway. Explicitly, the expected
return rate from rolling over is
RSn1 ¼ rS þ
lnP inf
tn1<stn
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0Vn1
 
t
þ ln n1
t
: ð8Þ
Table III summarizes the timing of the problem and the returns that can
be earned in the final time period.
We assume that each short-term creditor wants to maximize her return
over the whole time period ½0,T. Thus, a run at time tn1 occurs if the
expected rollover return RSn1 is smaller than the expected outside return
Rn1. From this, we can derive the bank run barrier n1 at time tn1 by
setting the expected outside return equal to the expected return from rolling
over. Hence, the bank run barrier n1 at time tn1 is defined as the critical
value Vn1 where the RHS of Equation (5) is equal to the RHS of Equation
(7) for Vn1 ¼ n1. Note that when setting the expected outside return,
given by equation (5), equal to the expected return from rolling over,
given by equation (7), the survival probability from a bank run drops out
of the equation. Therefore, at the last rollover date tn1, the survival prob-
ability from a bank run will not influence the bank run barrier. This will be
different at the previous rollover dates as we will discuss below. In the
terminal time period ½tn1, tn, short-term creditors can earn a maximal
return rate
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maxfRn1,RSn1g: ð9Þ
2.2.c Bank run barrier at time tn2
Now, we consider the returns over the time period ½tn2, tn. At time tn2,
short-term creditors have to worry not only about the return for the next
period, that is, up to time tn1, but also about the final time period ½tn1, tn,
as they want to maximize their total return. Thus, the expected return from
rolling over at time tn2 is
eR
S
n22t ¼ E emaxfRn1,RSn1gtjVn2
h i
 erSt  P inf
tn2<stn1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn2
 
 n2:
ð10Þ
The 1st term is the expected return from the final period and the product
of the remaining terms is the expected return from the period ½tn2, tn1.
Note that the expected return rate RSn1 in the conditional expectation
depends also on n1 (compare with Equation (8)). Hence, the expected
return rate from rolling over at time tn2 depends not only on the survival
probability from a bank run at time tn2 but also on the survival probability
from a bank run at time tn1. If short-term creditors decide to run at tn2,
they obtain the expected outside return
e2R

n2t ¼ e2rt  n2: ð11Þ
Table III. Investments and returns in the final time period
The table demonstrates the timing of the decision problem short-term creditors face at time
tn1. The left column shows the investment opportunities at time tn1 and the remaining
columns provide the corresponding returns at time tn depending on whether there is a bank
run at time tn1 and no insolvency default in ½tn1, tn (Column 4) or an insolvency default
in ½tn1, tn (Column 5), and on whether there is no bank run at time tn1 and no insolvency
default in ½tn1, tn (Column 2) or an insolvency default in ½tn1, tn (Column 3).
Investment at tn1
Return at time tn in case of
No bank run at tn1 and Bank run at tn1 and
No insolvency
in ½tn1, tn
Insolvency
in ½tn1, tn
No insolvency
in ½tn1, tn
Insolvency
in ½tn1, tn
Rollover at rate rS e
rSt 0 n1  erSt 0
Run and invest in r er
t er
t n1  ert n1  ert
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A run occurs if the expected rollover return equals the expected outside
return. This condition defines the bank run barrier at time tn2. Again, the
survival probability frrm a bank run at time tn2 drops out of the equation
when setting the RHS of Equation (10) equal to the RHS of Equation (11).
However, as already mentioned, the RHS of Equation (10) also depends on
n1 through the term RSn1 in the conditional expectation. Hence, the bank
run barrier at time tn2 does depend on the survival probability from a bank
run at the future rollover date tn1. Summing up, in the time period ½tn2, tn,
short-term creditors can earn a maximal return rate of
max Rn2,R
S
n2
	 

, ð12Þ
where RSn2 and R

n2 are implicitly defined via Equations (10) and (11),
respectively.
2.2.d Bank run barrier at any rollover date ti
We now consider an arbitrary rollover date ti. The expected outside return
from running at time ti is defined as
eR

i ðniÞt ¼ erðniÞt  i, ð13Þ
and the corresponding expected return rate is
Ri ¼ r þ
ln i
ðn iÞt : ð14Þ
The expected return from rolling over the debt at time ti is defined as
eR
S
i ðniÞt ¼ E emax Riþ1,RSiþ1
	 

ðni1ÞtjVi
 
 erSt  P inf
ti<stiþ1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVi
 
 i,
ð15Þ
and its return rate is given by:
RSi ¼
lnE emax R

iþ1,R
S
iþ1
	 

ðni1ÞtjVi
 
ðn iÞt
þ rSðn iÞ þ
lnP inf
ti<stiþ1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVi
 
ðn iÞt þ
i
ðn iÞt
ð16Þ
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for i ¼ 1, . . . , n 1. Note that the conditional expectation in the 1st term
implicitly depends on the survival probabilities iþ1, . . . , n1 from bank
runs at future rollover dates tiþ1, . . . , tn1. Thus, if short-term creditors
decide to roll over their debt, their exposure to illiquidity risk is higher
than when running on the firm, which is quite intuitive from economic mo-
tivation. More specifically, if short-term creditors run at time ti, they only
have to worry about a bank run at that time. If short-term creditors roll over
at ti, however, they are exposed to a possible bank run at ti and to those at
future rollover dates, that is, at tiþ1, . . . , tn1. The bank run barrier i can be
computed recursively and is given as the unique value Vi for which the RHS
of Equation (13) equals the RHS of Equation (15). Our main result is stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1
Recursive Computation of Bank Run Barrier under Assumptions 1 and 2, the
bank run barrier i at ti can be computed recursively and is the unique solution
of the equation in i
er
ðniÞt ¼ E emax Riþ1,RSiþ1
	 

ðni1ÞtjVi ¼ i
 
 erSt  P inf
ti<stiþ1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVi ¼ i
  ð17Þ
for i ¼ 1, . . . , n 1. The bank run barrier i is always higher than the insolv-
ency barrier i at the same time point.
Remark 3
Equation (17) is obtained by setting the RHS of Equation (13) and the RHS
of Equation (15) equal, where i drops out on both sides. The RHS of
Equation (17), however, does depend on the survival probabilities from
bank runs at the future decision dates tiþ1, . . . , tn1. For example, for
i ¼ n 2, Equation (17) can be reformulated as
1 ¼ E½n1 max
(
eðrSr
Þt, eðrSr
Þ2t  P inf
tn1<stn
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn1
 )
jVn2
 P inf
tn2<stn1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn2
 
:
Hence, the bank run barrier n2 at time tn2 is independent of n2 but
depends on the survival probability n1 from a run at time tn1.
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2.2.e Illiquidity barrier
In case of a bank run, the firm only defaults if the funds it can raise are not
sufficient to pay off short-term debt. Thus, we define the illiquidity barrier,
denoted by i, as
i ¼ minfi, Si  ertiM
 
= ig: ð18Þ
The 2nd term in the minimum function is the maximal asset value Vi such
that i ¼ 1. Thus, the illiquidity barrier is the critical asset value Vi such that
there is a run by short-term creditors and the firm is not able to pay off
short-term debt.
2.2.f Bank run scenarios
Depending on the asset value Vi at a rollover date ti, the following situations
are possible.
(i) If Vi  i, the firm will default due to insolvency.
(ii) If i < Vi  i, there is a bank run at time ti and the funds that can be
raised are not sufficient to pay off short-term creditors, that is,  iVi þ
ertiM < Si such that i < 1. Hence, the firm defaults due to illiquidity.
(iii) If i < Vi  i, there is a bank run at time ti, but the firm can raise
enough funds to pay off short-term debt. However, in doing so, the
firm has to buffer an additional loss. Instead of paying interest rate rS
for short-term debt, the firm has to pay interest rc > rS for the
collateralized debt. More specifically, the firm has to pay off
collateralized debt Si  ertiMð ÞercðTtiÞ at maturity T. Hence, the firm
remains solvent in ½ti,T only if VðtÞ > iðtÞ for all t 2 ½ti,T, where the
new insolvency barrier i at any time t 2 ½ti,T is defined as
iðtÞ  erðTtÞ Si  ertiM
 
ercðTtiÞ þ L0erLT
   : ð19Þ
Otherwise, the firm will default. As this bankruptcy is actually triggered
by the bank run at time ti, we interpret this default too as a default due
to illiquidity. Hence, in the case i < Vi  i we have to distinguish two
subcases.
(a) If inf
ti<st
ðVðsÞ  iðsÞÞ > 0, the firm remains solvent until maturity T
after the bank run at time ti.
(b) If inf
ti<st
ðVðsÞ  iðsÞÞ  0, the firm is not able to buffer the add-
itional loss from interest rate payments connected with the
collateralized debt at maturity T, and thus, defaults due to illi-
quidity problems.
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Figure 1 summarizes the different scenarios that can occur in our model.
Distinguishing these scenarios is important for the computation of the
default probabilities as we will see in Section 2.3.
2.3 DECOMPOSITION OF DEFAULT PROBABILITIES
In this section, we compute the total default probability PDtotal and decom-
pose it into an insolvency part PDins and an illiquidity part PDill. Therefore,
we use the insolvency barrier t for t 2 ½0,T, the bank run barriers i, and
the illiquidity barriers i for i ¼ 1, 2,  s, n 1, which we computed in Section
2.2. As discussed above, a bank run does not necessarily lead to a default in
our model. Examining the different scenarios that lead to a default
(illustrated in Figure 1), we can compute the survival probability PStotal
that the financial institution will stay alive from t 2 ðti1, ti (i ¼ 1, 2,  s, n)
to tn as
Bank run
at time ti
Vi ≤ αi Vi > αi
Default due to
insolvency
Raise new funds by issuing
collateralized debt
λ < 1 λ = 1
Default due to
illiquidity
Pay oﬀ short-
term debt Si
V (t) ≤ α¯i(t) for
some t ∈ (ti, t]
V (t) > α¯i(t)
∀t ∈ (ti, T ]
Default due to
illiquidity
No default
Figure 1. Possible scenarios in case of a bank run. The flowchart demonstrates the different
scenarios that can occur in case of a bank run at time ti. Here, i is the insolvency barrier
for balance sheet I in Table I, and i is the insolvency barrier for balance sheet II in
Table II after pledging risky assets as collateral.
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PStotalðtÞ ¼ E 1
inf
tstn
fVðsÞðsÞg0
n o Yn1
j¼i
1fVj j and inf
tjutn
fVðuÞ jðuÞg0gjVðtÞ
2
4
3
5,
ð20Þ
where i is defined by Equation (19), and with the convention that in case of
i¼ n, the empty product equals one. The 1st term in the conditional expect-
ation means that the asset value must stay above the insolvency barrier in the
time period ½t,T. The 2nd term basically means that the financial institution
must stay above all illiquidity barriers at each decision node, and that the
firm is able to buffer the additional losses from higher interest rate payments
connected with the collateralized debt. From Equation (20), we can easily
calculate the total default probability PDtotalðtÞ for any time t 2 ½0,T as
PDtotalðtÞ ¼ 1 PStotalðtÞ: ð21Þ
The default probability due to insolvency at any time t 2 ½0,T can be
computed analytically as in Black and Cox (1976) as the probability that
the asset value will fall below the insolvency barrier at any time between time
t and maturity T, that is,
PDinsðtÞ ¼ P inf
tsT
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ < 0jVðtÞ
 
¼ 
ln ðTÞVðtÞ  ð 12 2ÞðT tÞ

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T tp
 !
þ VðtÞ
ðtÞ
 12r
2

ln 
2ðtÞ
VðtÞðTÞ
 
þ ð 12 2ÞðT tÞ

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T tp
0
@
1
A:
ð22Þ
The default probability due to illiquidity at time t 2 ½0,T can then be
derived as the difference between the total default probability and the in-
solvency default probability, that is,
PDillðtÞ ¼ PDtotalðtÞ  PDinsðtÞ: ð23Þ
This is the probability that the asset value at some decision date will be less
than the bank run barrier. In addition, the firm is not able to pay off short-
term creditors with the capital it can raise at that time or will default in ½t,T
as it cannot buffer the additional loss from higher interest rate payments.
Given the above default probability PDtotal and the expected rollover
return RS0 , computed by equation (16), we can calculate the expected
values of short- and long-term debt.
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Theorem 2
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the expected value at time t of long-term debt with
initial investment L0 is
DLðtÞ ¼ erðTtÞ L0erLTð1 PDtotalðtÞÞ
	 

: ð24Þ
At each date ti (for i ¼ 0, . . . , n), the expected value of short-term debt with
initial investment S0 is
DSi ¼ erðTtiÞ S0erStiemaxfR
S
i ,R

i gðTtiÞ
n o
: ð25Þ
Between two rollover dates t 2 ðti1, tiÞ, the expected value of short-term
debt is
DSðtÞ ¼ erðTtÞ S0erStiE emaxfRSi ,Ri gðTtiÞjVðtÞ
h i
P inf
t<sti
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVðtÞ
  
:
ð26Þ
Therefore, the expected value of short-term debt is a process that is left
continuous with right limits. At each rollover date ti (for i ¼ 1, . . . , n 1), the
process satisfies
DSi ¼ max iDSi,þ, erðTtiÞfS0erStieR

i ðTtiÞg
n o
, ð27Þ
where DSi,þ ¼ lim
t#ti
DSðtÞ. Here, RSi and Ri are defined recursively by
Equations (16) and (14), respectively, with the convention 0 ¼ 1.
For Equations (24–26), the terms in the braces are the values of long- and
short-term debt, respectively, at terminal time T conditional on the current
state. As an example, let us examine Equation (26) more closely. The 1st
term S0e
rSti ¼ Si is the principal value of short-term debt at the rollover date
ti. Short-term creditors make their decision whether to rollover their debt or
not at time ti and obtain the maximal interest rate maxfRSi ,Ri g for the time
period ½ti,T. This is, of course, conditional on the firm being solvent in the
time period ½t, ti, which explains the last term in the brace.
Moreover, as stated in the theorem, short-term debt value is a process that
is left continuous with right limits. Before the next decision date ti, the
expected debt value depends on the survival probability i from a bank
run at time ti. Immediately after the rollover date, that is, at time t
þ
i ,
whether or not the firm survived a run is known, leading to a jump in the
debt value resulting in Equation (27).
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3. Numerical Results
3.1 DATA DESCRIPTION
We empirically test our model by applying it to the example of Merrill
Lynch. Therefore, we calibrate the parameters of our model to the data of
Merrill Lynch on October 10 2008, just before the US government
announced a large intervention in the financial sector.7 We obtain the
balance sheet information for Merrill Lynch from Table 2 in Veronesi and
Zingales (2010). For the risk-free rate in our model, we choose the average 1-
year Treasury rate during the second half of 2008, which is r ¼ 1:56%.8
For long-term debt in our model, we choose a maturity of T¼ 3 years,
that is, we consider debt issued on October 10 2008 and expiring on
September 10 2011. The 3-year CDS spread on October 10 2008 for
Merrill Lynch is 4.30% and the 3-year treasury rate on that date is 1.87%.
Thus, the interest rate for 3-year debt for Merrill Lynch is approximately
equal to rL ¼ 4:30%þ 1:87% ¼ 6:17%. The balance sheet of Merrill Lynch
shows long-term debt of $232.5 bn and other liabilities of $272.0 bn which
we will also consider as long-term. The average coupon rate of long-term
debt outstanding is reported as 3.26%, and the average maturity is 4.9 years.
The 5-year CDS spread on October 10 2008 is stated as 3.98%, and the 5-
year treasury rate is 2.77%, implying an interest rate of approximately
6.75% for 5-year debt for Merrill Lynch. From these data, we can
compute the present value of long-term debt principal and coupons as
X5
i¼1
3:26%  $ð232:5þ 272:0Þ bn  e0:0675i þ $ð232:5þ 272:0Þ bn
 e0:06755 ¼ $427:5 bn :
As long-term debt in our model is a zero-coupon bond, we set LT equal to
the principal of an equivalent zero-coupon bond with 3-year maturity,
that is,
LT ¼ $427:5 bn  e0:06173 ¼ $514:4 bn:
Moreover, the balance sheet of Merrill Lynch reports short-term debt of
$242.9 bn and deposits of $90.0 bn. As both do not pay any coupons, we set
7 Under this plan, the largest US commercial banks received a $125 bn equity infusion and
a 3-year government guarantee on new unsecured bank debt issues. Compare Veronesi and
Zingales (2010).
8 Compare Federal Reserve statistical releases. See also He and Xiong (2012b).
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S1 ¼ $ð242:9þ 90:0Þ bn ¼ $332:9 bn:
We assume a rollover frequency of t ¼ 3 month, that is, we have eleven
rollover dates until maturity as T itself is no decision date. The 6-month
CDS spread on October 10 2008 for Merrill Lynch is 4.88%, and the 6-
month treasury rate on that date is 0.84%. As this is the shortest maturity
CDS spread reported, we set the short-term rate in our model equal to
rS ¼ 5:72%. Thus, we obtain
S0 ¼ $332:9 bn  e0:05721=4 ¼ $328:2 bn:
We compute the firesale rates at the decision points from leverage data for
the high-yield market based on quarterly data between September 30 2008
and March 31 2011 as provided by the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
Leverage ratios Li for dates ti reported in Table IV have been computed as
Net Debt over LTM EBITDA, that is, as earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization for 12 consecutive months prior to the date
of measurement. Motivated by recent work of Geanakoplos (2009), we
define the haircut rate H as the reciprocal of leverage, that is,
HðtÞ ¼ 1=LðtÞ. This means that when the firm, for some reason, is forced
to raise capital by pledging its risky assets as collateral, it has to cut off
1=LðtÞ of the market value of the assets, that is, the capital which the firm
can raise is
 ðtÞVðtÞ ¼ 1HðtÞð ÞVðtÞ ¼ 1 1LðtÞ
 
VðtÞ: ð28Þ
We apply this relationship between leverage ratios and firesale rates to de-
termine  i for every rollover date i ¼ 1, . . . , n 1 from the leverage data of
Merrill Lynch. The results are reported in Table IV.
We set the initial asset value in our model equal to the value for total
assets reported in Table 2 of Veronesi and Zingales (2010), that is,
V0 ¼ $875:8 bn: The actual volatility for Merrill Lynch is reported as
177.94%. This is the annualized daily standard deviation of daily returns
estimated during the period July–September 2008. From this, we can
estimate an annual volatility of  ¼ 177:94%= ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ250p ¼ 11:25%. As our
model assumes risk-neutral investors, we set the drift rate equal to the
risk-free rate, that is,  ¼ 1:56%.
It has been shown in Chen (2010) that the historical average of the
recovery rates of bonds is about 40%. Therefore, we set the safety
covenant equal to  ¼ 60%.
We set the cash amount M¼ 0 and the outside return r equal to the risk-
free rate of r ¼ 1:56%. Finally, we set the interest rate rc for collateralized
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debt equal to rc ¼ 8% as this should be interpreted as the interest rate in a
distressed state.
3.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Our numerical results are based on the binomial tree implementation
described in the online supplement. To ensure a sufficiently close approxi-
mation of the continuous time case, we chose a high number m¼ 250 of
interim dates in our calculations.
Figure 2 shows two simulations of a bank run by short-term creditors for
the example of Merrill Lynch. Maturity is T¼ 3 years and we consider eleven
rollover dates, that is, every 3 months. The light solid curves describe two
simulated paths for the asset value process following a geometric Brownian
motion. The dashed and the dotted graphs illustrate the illiquidity barrier
and the bank run barrier, respectively. The dark solid graph is the insolvency
barrier. The eleven rollover dates for short-term funding are marked. Note
that the first decision date is at time t¼ 3 months, and there is no bank run
barrier before that date. Moreover, there does not exist a bank run barrier at
maturity T¼ 3 years as short-term creditors do not have to face a decision at
that date. At the rollover date t6 ¼ 18 months, one of the simulated paths is
less than the bank barrier, such that the short-term creditors would decide to
run on the financial institution at that date. By pledging risky assets as
collateral to raise new funds, the insolvency barrier changes to
Table IV. Leverage and firesale rates for Merrill Lynch
The table shows the leverage ratios Li for Merrill Lynch between
September 30 2008 and March 31 2011. The firesale rates are
computed from the leverage ratios as  i ¼ 1 1=Li.
Date ti Leverage ratio Li
Implied firesale
rate  i ¼ 1 1=Li
September 30 2008 3.8 0.73
December 31 2008 3.7 0.73
March 31 2009 3.9 0.75
June 30 2009 3.9 0.74
September 30 2009 4.2 0.76
December 31 2009 3.9 0.74
March 31 2010 3.6 0.72
June 30 2010 3.4 0.71
September 30 2010 3.4 0.70
December 31 2010 3.5 0.72
March 31 2011 3.6 0.72
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6ðtÞ ¼ 0:65  e0:0156ð3tÞ  $327:6 bn  e0:05721:5e0:081:5 þ $514:4 bn  e0:06173
 
¼ e0:0156ð3tÞ  $715:7 bn:
This barrier is illustrated in the figure as the dashed–dotted line. The
simulated asset value falls below this barrier between the 8th and the 9th
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Figure 2. Default simulation with eleven rollover dates. The figure shows a bank run
scenario. The light solid curves describe two simulated paths for the asset value process
following a geometric Brownian motion. The dashed and the dotted graphs illustrate the
illiquidity barrier and the bank run barrier, respectively, where we used n 1 ¼ 11 rollover
dates (i.e., every 3 months). At the marked decision date t6 ¼ 18 months, one simulated
asset value is less than the bank run barrier, such that short-term creditors would decide to
run on the financial institution at that date. The insolvency barrier changes after the run to
the new barrier 6 (described by the dash–dotted graph in the figure). The simulated path
falls below this new insolvency barrier between the 8th and 9th rollover date. Thus, in that
case, the bank run at time t6 would trigger a default due to illiquidity. The other simulated
path falls below the bank run barrier at t8. The new insolvency barrier 8ðtÞ almost coin-
cides with 6ðtÞ and, therefore, is omitted in the figure. The simulated path always stays
above this barrier until maturity such that the firm would survive the bank run. For the
computation of the barriers, we used the parameters derived for Merrill Lynch in Section
3.1. For the safety covenant, we used  ¼ 70%. For the simulations in the binomial tree,
m¼ 250 interim time steps are used.
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rollover date triggering a default due to illiquidity.9 This default event
cannot be captured in a classical structural credit risk model such as Black
and Cox (1976) as the financial institution is still solvent at that time, that is,
the simulated asset value stays above the insolvency barrier ðtÞ until that
date. In the Black and Cox (1976) model, a default due to insolvency would
occur later in time, namely at the 10th rollover date, when the simulated
asset value falls below the insolvency barrier ðtÞ. By taking liquidity risk
into account, however, our novel approach can indeed account for this kind
of default scenario as illustrated in Figure 2. The other simulated path falls
below the bank run barrier at t8 ¼ 24 months. The new insolvency barrier
8ðtÞ almost coincides with 6ðtÞ. Therefore, we did not include it in the
figure. This path, however, always stays above the new insolvency barrier,
such that the firm would survive the bank run in that case.
Figure 3 (a) shows the decomposition of the total default probability into
its insolvency and illiquidity components for increasing initial asset value V0:
For very low V0, the financial institution will almost surely default due to
insolvency, that is, PDins ¼ 1: In these cases, the reason for a default is
clearly insolvency and not any liquidity problem. In particular, the default
is caused by the event that the asset value falls below the insolvency barrier
ðtÞ at some time t 2 ð0,T. The insolvency barrier increases in time from 577
to 586 (compare Panel B), such that PDins ¼ 1 for initial asset values less
than 577 and PDill ¼ 0 in these situations. For higher initial asset values, a
default due to the fact that the asset value falls below the insolvency barrier
becomes more and more unlikely, while the probability that the financial
institution will default due to illiquidity problems increases up to a critical
point. For initial asset values higher than this critical point, the probability
that the asset value process stays above the illiquidity barrier and the firm is
able to pay off collateralized debt at maturity is increasing again, such that
the illiquidity default probability, and thus, also total default risk decreases.
Figure 3 (b) illustrates the time-dependent bank run, illiquidity, and in-
solvency barrier for the case of eleven rollover dates. As proved theoretically
in Theorem 1, the figure shows that the bank run barrier is always higher
than the insolvency barrier. Moreover, by definition, the illiquidity barrier
lies between the bank run barrier and the insolvency barrier.
9 Note that the simulated path of the asset value process falls below the illiquidity barrier
at the 9th rollover date. However, since the balance sheet has changed after the bank run at
date t6, such that, there is no more short-term debt left, the illiquidity barrier is irrelevant
after the bank run, and the drop below that barrier does not necessarily lead to a default.
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As illustrated in Figure 4 (a), we get that the total default risk is increasing
in volatility s. This is also intuitive as higher volatility leads to higher fluc-
tuations in the asset value, and thus increases the total default risk.
Furthermore, we studied the influence of the outside option return r on
the total default probability. As shown in Figure 4 (b), total default risk is
increasing in the outside option return r. This is due to the fact that running
on the financial institution becomes more attractive. The higher the outside
option return, the more likely are the short-term creditors to run.
3.3 EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
It has been shown in Adrian and Shin (2008, 2010) that the leverage ratio,
and in particular, the use of very short-term financing for the largest US
investment banks, dramatically increased during the financial crisis 2007–08
and shortly before. This means that financial institutions borrowed short-
term on the interbank market and invested in long-term risky assets. Due to
this maturity mismatch, short-term debt had to be rolled over frequently, and
banks had to rely on the possibility to refinance themselves on a short-term
basis on the interbank market. Hence, they were heavily exposed to rollover
risk. The recent work of Brunnermeier and Oehmke (forthcoming) provides
theoretical support for this empirical phenomenon of a maturity mismatch.
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Figure 3. Default barriers and influence of initial asset value on default probability. (a)
illustrates how the total default probability PDtotal, the insolvency probability PDins, and the
illiquidity probability PDill vary with increasing initial asset value V0. The parameters are
chosen for the example of Merrill Lynch (see Section 3.1). We use a safety covenant of
 ¼ 60%. The number of rollover dates is fixed as n 1 ¼ 11. (b) Shows how the individual
barriers change with time. For the simulations in the binomial tree, m¼ 250 interim time
steps are used.
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The authors show that in equilibrium, financial institutions choose maturity
structures that are inefficiently short-term. As high rollover frequencies
make early liquidation more likely, this excessive reliance on short-term
financing results in unnecessary rollover risk and inefficient debt runs.
This emphasizes the importance of quantifying these risks and imposing
regulatory restrictions on short-term financing to preserve financial stability.
Our model provides a method to explicitly quantify this rollover risk, and
our empirical results highlight the importance of the maturity structure for
financial stability. More specifically, Figure 5 (a) shows the influence of the
number of rollover dates on the default probabilities in our model. The
illiquidity PD is monotonically increasing with increasing rollover frequency.
This can be explained by the fact that more rollover dates mean that short-
term creditors have more possibilities to run on the financial institution,
implying that the probability that the firm will encounter illiquidity
problems is increasing. Hence, both the total default probability and the
illiquidity probability should increase with the number of rollover dates.
The insolvency probability, in contrast, is almost unaffected by the
rollover frequency.
Figure 5 (b) shows that the total default probability as well as the illiquid-
ity probability are increasing in the short-term debt ratio. The reason for this
is that the influence of the short-term debt ratio on the illiquidity default
probability is mainly through the survival probability i from a bank run.
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Figure 4. Influence of volatility and rollover frequency on default probabilities. The figures
show how volatility s (Panel A) and outside option return r (Panel B) influence the default
probabilities. We use the parameters described in Section 3.1 with a safety covenant of
 ¼ 60%. In Panel A, we vary the volatility s between 10% and 20%. In Panel B, we vary
the outside return r between 1.5% and 5.5%. For the simulations in the binomial tree,
m¼ 250 interim time steps are used.
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For small short-term debt ratio, i will always be one, because the financial
institution will almost surely be able to pay off short-term creditors. In these
cases, the firm will quite likely survive a bank run. For a high short-term
debt ratio, however, the survival probability i from a bank run will be very
small, such that a default due to illiquidity, as a consequence of a bank run,
becomes very likely.
In this way, our article supports the theoretical results of Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (forthcoming) and the empirical findings of Adrian and Shin
(2008, 2010). Moreover, the empirical predictions of our model provide
support for the reform package “Basel III” introduced by the Basel
Committee of Banking Supervision to enhance financial stability. As one
building block in BCBS (2010a, b), minimum global liquidity standards have
been suggested to improve banks’ resilience to acute short-term stress and to
improve longer term funding. In particular, a liquidity coverage ratio, to
ensure that a financial institution holds enough liquid assets, and a net
stable funding ratio have been introduced. The latter ensures that the ratio
of the available amount of stable funding over the required amount of stable
funding is more than 100%. Hence, it aims at reducing the above discussed
maturity mismatch problem.
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Figure 5. Influence of outside option return and short-term debt ratio on default probabil-
ity. The figures show the dependence of the total default probability PDtotal, the insolvency
probability PDins, and the illiquidity probability PDill on the rollover frequency n – 1 (Panel
A) and on the ratio of short-term debt ST over total debt ST þ LT (Panel B). We use the
parameters specified in Section 3.1. In Panel A, we vary the number n – 1 of rollover dates
between one and eleven. For this figure, we use a constant firesale rate of  ¼ 70%. In
graph (b), we fixed the sum of short- and long-term debt face value (ST þ LT) to $800 bn.
For the simulations in the binomial tree, m¼ 250 interim time steps are used.
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A consequence of this maturity mismatch and the heavy reliance on short-
term financing during the financial crisis 2007–08 and shortly before was that
banks, which experienced financial distress, encountered severe difficulties in
refinancing themselves on the interbank market. Hence, they were forced to
sell their risky assets exactly when prices were low. The resulting loss spiral
has been discussed in Brunnermeier (2009). Moreover, other traders might
force the distressed financial institutions to sell their toxic assets at firesale
prices, and thereby, to reduce their leverage ratios. This enforces the loss
spiral even further as has been theoretically shown in Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) and empirically confirmed in Adrian and Shin (2008).
Therefore, it has been suggested that, besides interest rates, leverage (and
thereby, firesale rates) can be used as monetary policy tools (see, e.g.,
Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2010; Morris and Shin, 2009; and
Geanakoplos, 2009). When liquidity is tight, central banks can either
lower interest rates or provide lending with more generous haircut to
enhance liquidity in the market. In Figure 6 (a), we increased the firesale
rate  from 60% to 70%. Here, we chose the firesale rate to be constant for
all decision dates. The figure shows that the total default probability is
decreasing with increasing firesale rates, that is, with decreasing haircuts.
Thereby, lowering haircuts has a similar effect as decreasing interest rates
(see Panel B in Figure 6). Hence, our result supports the above suggestion. If
central banks are lending money at a generous haircut (i.e., at a higher
firesale rate), this means that the firm can negotiate a better haircut with
the central bank when failing to borrow against the risky assets from other
financial institution, which in turn increases liquidity in the market.
In the figure, we used a safety covenant of  ¼ 55% as suggested in He and
Xiong (2012b). For higher safety covenants, the total default probability is
mainly influenced by the likelihood that the asset value falls below the in-
solvency barrier , or in case of a bank run, below the new insolvency barrier
. The firesale rate then only has a very small influence. The intuition
underlying this is that the firm might be able to raise enough funds to pay
off short-term debt, but in doing so, the firm is exposed to bankruptcy risk. If
it is not able to pay back collateralized debt, it will default. This probability
increases significantly when the safety covenant r increases.
4. Extensions and Discussion
4.1 ENDOGENOUS FIRESALE RATE
The firesale price  iVi at time ti in our multiperiod bank run model is defined
as the funds that can be raised by pledging the risky asset as collateral to the
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lending banks. As already discussed in Section 3.1, the determination of the
firesale rate  depends on the concept of leverage L, which is given as the
ratio of total assets over equity, that is,
LðtÞ ¼ VðtÞ
VðtÞ DðtÞ ,
where D(t) denotes the debt value at time t. Due to Equation (28), the firesale
price at any rollover date ti in our model can be defined endogenously as
 iVi ¼ Di,þ, ð29Þ
where Di,þ ¼ Dðtþi Þ and tþi is the time right after the rollover date ti. At a
given rollover time, Di,þ is the expected debt value conditional on the asset
value Vi without taking into account the survival probability from a bank
run at time ti. We compute the total debt value as Di,þ ¼ DSi,þ þDLi , where
the values of short- and long-term debt are defined as in Theorem 2. Note
that DSðtÞ is a left continuous process with right limits. Before the next
rollover date ti, the debt value depends on the survival probability from a
bank run at ti. Immediately after the decision date ti, however, whether the
firm survived a run or not is known. This leads to a jump in the debt value.
Since the expected debt value is increasing in the asset value, the firesale price
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Figure 6. Two monetary tools. The figure exhibits the sensitivity of the total default prob-
ability with respect to the firesale rate  and with respect to the interest rate rc for
collateralized debt. We use the parameters of Section 3.1. In Panel A, we fix the rate rc
for collateralized debt to 2% and increase the firesale rate from 60% to 70% (constant for
all decision dates). In Panel B, we fix  ¼ 60% and vary the interest rate rc for
collateralized debt between 2% and 10%. The safety covenant is  ¼ 55%. For the simu-
lations in the binomial tree, m¼ 250 interim time steps are used.
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will also be higher when the asset value at a rollover date ti is higher.
Moreover, the firesale price is affected by the future rollover risk, and
hence, by illiquidity risk. The more likely a bank run is to occur in the
future, the lower will be the firesale price. This endogenous determination
of the firesale rate is of course only forward looking and does not consider
the current illiquidity risk, that is, the risk from a bank run at time ti.
However, it provides reasonable results while keeping numerical tractability.
Figure 7 shows that leverage is time varying and pro-cyclical, that is, it is
high in boom times and low in recession times. An excellent empirical study
on leverage has been carried out by Adrian and Shin (2010). To determine
the leverage, and thereby, the firesale rate, in practice, is a challenging task.
Earlier work on firesale rates include Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). These
papers emphasize the asymmetric information between a borrower and a
lender, leading to a principal agent problem. In contrast to the aforemen-
tioned literature, Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2009) argues that leverage,
which is endogenously determined in general equilibrium theory, is not
determined by asymmetric information but by the distribution of collateral
payoffs. The determination of leverage in the abovementioned papers, from
a practical modeling point of view, unfortunately has to be compromised by
an additional constraint, such as the margin requirement in Gaˆrleanu and
Pedersen (2011) and Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010), or the VaR
constraint in Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009). Deriving endogenous
firesale rates by general equilibrium theory is beyond the scope of this article.
It should be noted, however, that it is in principle possible to incorporate
these more microfounded determinations of firesale prices in our model.
However, including these frameworks in our setting will insert some new
parameters, for example, the level of risk tolerance of market participants,
the determination of which might be problematic for practical applications.
4.2 COMPETITION AMONG BANKS
In our article, we consider a bank run model with one bank. Hence, the
question arises whether such a monopolistic bank model can fully capture all
the salient features of the real world.10 In real markets, competition among
banks will influence the interest rates rS and rL, offered by a financial insti-
tution. To study the effect of competing firms, one can consider a market
with K financial institutions Bk issuing short- and long-term debt at rates r
k
S
and rkL, respectively, to finance risky assets for k ¼ 1, . . . ,K. Suppose that
10 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this question to us.
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these firms do not lend money. Instead, assume that there exists a represen-
tative creditor who wants to invest an amount S0 short term and an amount
L0 long term in the market. Then, the creditor has to determine the portion
!k 2 ½0, 1 of S0, which she will invest for a short term in institution Bk at rate
rkS. Similarly, she has to determine the portion 	k 2 ½0, 1 of L0, which she will
invest for a long term in the same institution at rate rkL. The creditor deter-
mines !k and 	k to maximize her return subject to the constraint that the risk
(measured by some appropriate risk measure) of her position is below some
exogenously given level. The financial institution Bk, on the contrary, has to
finance its risky assets with short-term debt !kS0 and long-term debt 	kL0.
Equilibrium markets should clear, which means that the financial institution
Bk issues short- and long-term debt at the lowest possible rates r
k
S and r
k
L such
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Figure 7. Average leverage over time. The figure shows the time evolution of both the
leverage and the firesale rate for the high-yield market based on quarterly data between
December 31 1996 and March 31 2011, as provided by the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
Leverage has been computed as net debt over LTM EBITDA, that is, the earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for 12 consecutive months prior to the date
of measurement. Firesale rate is computed as 1–1/leverage.
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that it is able to finance its risky assets using liabilities !kS0 þ 	kL0. Note
that in equilibrium, rkS and r
k
L will always be higher than the risk-free rate r,
which can be interpreted as the outside rate r in this framework. Otherwise,
the creditor will not participate in the debt market but instead invest in the
risk-free rate. Hence, the assumptions of our model are still satisfied in this
setting.
Solving such a general equilibrium model leads to a complex numerical
problem since the constraint of the creditor, that the risk of her position does
not exceed a given level, depends on the default probabilities of each firm in
the market. The latter can be computed in our structural approach for given
parameters rkS, r
k
L,!kS0, and 	kL0, for every k ¼ 1, . . . ,K. In general, such a
problem should be numerically solvable, though only with considerable com-
putational effort. Such an equilibrium approach offers a way to endogenize
rS and rL as well as the capital structure characterized by S0 and L0.
However, it does not change the general results of our article; for
example, the total default probability is decreasing with increasing short-
term rate rS since short-term creditors will more likely decide to roll over
their debt. Moreover, since our article is mainly motivated by classical struc-
tural credit risk models, where these parameters are exogenous, we do not
investigate this idea further.
4.3 FURTHER EXTENSIONS
As already discussed in Remark 2, in real life, one observes new data for the
short-term rate rS, the market rate r
, asset volatility, etc., at each decision
date. These will surely influence the rollover decision of short-term creditors
as well as the investment decisions of new creditors. Hence, in reality, one
actually faces a superposition of processes of the type we discuss in this
article. Incorporating these features in our current setting would significantly
complicate our model. Moreover, analyzing the economic implications in
such a general setting will be much more complicated. For a real-life appli-
cation, however, taking these possibilities into account seems to be very
important. We will leave this problem for future research.
In our model, short-term creditors can decide whether to roll over their
debt or not at a finite number of rollover dates t1, . . . , tn1. Hence, it seems
natural to consider the extension of our model to the continuous bank run
case, that is, to the situation where creditors can decide to run on the firm at
any time. This extension, however, is not as simple as it seems to be at first
sight. The main difficulty arises from the formulation of the value function
for short-term creditors, that is, the expected value of short-term debt DSðtÞ
at any time t 2 ½0,T, or alternatively, from the specification of the expected
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rollover return RSðtÞ at any time t 2 ½0,T. In contrast to standard equations
of Bellman type, in our dynamic programming equation, short-term cred-
itors need to update their value function DS, or equivalently, RSi at each
rollover date by updating their beliefs about the survival probability from a
bank run. Thus, the expected return RSi in our model is always discounted by
i. Due to this feature, we cannot derive a corresponding free-boundary
problem or optimal stopping time problem for short-term creditors when
the rollover frequency tends to infinity.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to study the impact of liquidity risk
on systemic risk in our multiperiod bank run model. Here, systemic risk is
understood as the risk that financial distress, initially affecting only a single
institution or a small number of firms, can spread to a large part of a certain
sector or even to the whole economy. Classical bank run models based on
spillover effects, for example, through interbank lending as in Allen and
Gale (2000), could be extended to our definition of total credit risk.
Hence, one could study the effect that the default due to illiquidity of a
financial institution leads to defaults of its counterparties, and thereby in-
creases systemic risk in the financial sector.11 Related work in this context
has been carried out in Cont, Moussa, and Santos (2010), who provide a
quantitative model for default contagion in a network structure, where firms
can default because of insufficiently many liquid assets.
4.4 RELATED LITERATURE
There already exists extensive theoretical literature on potential causes for
bank runs due to liquidity risk. The classical models of Bryant (1980),
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Rochet and Vives (2004), for example,
provide evidence for the fact that runs can occur due to self-fulfillment of
depositor’s expectations concerning the behavior of other depositors. Thus,
bank runs are a result of coordination problems among short-duration de-
positors’ rollover decisions. Morris and Shin (2000, 2004) and Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) use global games methods to model the coordination
problem in rollover decisions. All these papers, however, do not consider
the influence of future default risk on today’s decisions. Guimaraes (2006)
and He and Xiong (2012a, b) extend these models of static coordination
problems to dynamic ones. In He and Xiong (2012b), the firm’s debt expir-
ations follow a Poisson distribution with infinite time horizon. The authors
endogenously determine the unique threshold value such that each maturing
creditor would decide to run on the firm if the asset value falls below this
11 We refer to Morris and Shin (2004) for related models on market runs.
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threshold. In their model as well as in our setting, the decision of a short-
term creditor whether to roll over her debt or not after expiration depends
also on her expectation about the rollover decisions of creditors maturing at
different times. However, in contrast to our setting, their model cannot
capture the impact of the rollover decision of other creditors maturing at
the same time. This effect can indeed be significant, in particular, as shown in
Adrian and Shin (2010, 2008), that the use of very short-term financing
dramatically increased during the financial crisis 2007–08 and shortly before.
Our model bears similarities with Morris and Shin (2009) in that at the
rollover dates, the coordination problem between short-term creditors is a
binary decision in terms of global games. The concept of global games has
been introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and has been success-
fully applied to dynamic coordination problems in Morris and Shin (1998,
2003). In Morris and Shin (2009), the authors solve for the unique equilib-
rium in the coordination problem faced by short-term creditors. Using
global game arguments for the rollover decision between short-term cred-
itors, they prove that in equilibrium, the ratio of raised funds to the principle
of the due short-term debt measures the likelihood of a bank run. In our
model, we interpret this ratio as the survival probability from a bank run
(compare Assumption 1). This ratio is connected with the firesale rate, which
can be determined endogenously in our model (compare with Section 4.1),
and which plays an important role in deriving the illiquidity barrier.
Our article contributes to the existing literature in the following way. Our
model is, to the best of our knowledge, the first structural credit risk model
that takes into account both insolvency risk and illiquidity risk and that can
accommodate multiple rollover times for short-term debt. Our model is fully
dynamic in the sense that at each rollover date, the short-term creditors’
decision, whether to renew their funding or not, does not only depend on
future insolvency risk but also on future illiquidity risk, represented by the
possibility of bank runs at later decision dates. Unlike the two-period game
theoretic approach of Morris and Shin (2009) with a single rollover date, our
model can accommodate multiple rollover dates. Thus, a run can happen at
any of these rollover dates. In fact, from the valuation of both short- and
long-term debt in our model, it is also clear that debt value decreases with
increasing rollover frequency. This cannot be revealed in models with only
one decision date as in Morris and Shin (2009). The multiple maturity struc-
ture makes our model more realistic in comparison to previous approaches
because in practice, banks usually finance themselves by a combination of
repo transactions, commercial papers, and very short-duration contracts
with high rollover frequencies. Moreover, insolvency can happen at any
time until maturity in our setting. On the one hand, these features make
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our model ready for practical application. On the other hand, they also
complicate the model significantly. Mathematically, the extension to a
multiperiod setting can be compared to switching from European to
Bermudan option pricing problems.
Another important distinction from Morris and Shin (2009) is that in their
model, when short-term creditors choose not to roll over their debt, they can
always get the face value of their debt back and go to the market to earn the
return r. This, however, is only true when the financial institution is healthy
and has enough cash to pay back the creditors. Under such an assumption,
the incentive of the short-term creditors not to renew their funding clearly
increases. In our article, we model the expected return from running on the
firm depending on the financial institution’s condition. If it is healthy, the
likelihood that creditors will get the face value of their debt back is high; if it
is in distress (with significant haircut of the asset value), the survival prob-
ability of a bank run is low such that the expected outside return is also
lower.
The results in Huang and Huang (2003) and Bao, Pan, J. and Wang (2011)
suggest that illiquidity risk can explain a significant fraction of credit
spreads. Theoretical models, such as Ericsson and Renault (2006), in
which illiquidity is caused by debt trading distress, and Morellec (2001), in
which illiquidity is caused by asset trading restriction, reveal that the spread
is increasing with liquidity risk. In their approach, illiquidity stems from an
exogenously given liquidity shock. In our model, we can explicitly quantify
the add-on to the insolvency default probability that is solely due to liquidity
risk. Our model shows the same results as the aforementioned literature, but
allows us to distinguish the contribution of each risk component to total
default risk. Hence, from a risk management perspective, our novel
approach enables the corresponding risks to be hedged more effectively.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we presented a new multiperiod bank run model that includes
illiquidity risk and insolvency risk. Using a structural credit risk modeling
approach, similar to the classical Black and Cox (1976) model for insolvency
risk, and incorporating illiquidity risk through the possibility of short-term
creditors to run on the firm, we succeeded in splitting total default probabil-
ity into an insolvency component and an illiquidity component. We studied
their dependencies on the individual model parameters and showed that total
default risk is increasing in volatility and in the ratio of short-term funding
over total debt. These results are in accordance with previously derived
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implications by Morris and Shin (2009) for the situation with only one
rollover date. Moreover, we showed that illiquidity risk is increasing in the
number of rollover dates and that increasing leverage in the market will
decrease default probabilities. The latter, in particular, provides evidence
that leverage should be used as an additional monetary policy tool
(besides interest rates) to enhance liquidity in the market, which has also
been pointed out by Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010).
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Review of finance online.
Appendix A
A.1. Proofs of Main Results
A.1.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution to Equation (17).
For i ¼ n 1, Equation (17) simplifies to
eðr
rSÞt ¼ P inf
tn1<stn
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn1
 
: ðA:1Þ
The RHS is strictly increasing and continuous as a function of the asset
value Vn1 2 ½n1,1Þ and takes values in ½0, 1. As r < rS by Assumption
1, there exists a unique solution to Equation (A.1).
For i ¼ n 2, Equation (17) can be reformulated as
1 ¼ E½n1 max
(
eðrSr
Þt, eðrSr
Þ2t
 P inf
tn1<stn
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn1
 )
jVn2
 P inf
tn2<stn1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn2
 
:
Note that the RHS of the above equation is a strictly increasing and
continuous function in Vn2 2 ½n2,1Þ as the survival probability from a
bank run and the survival probability from insolvency are continuous and
increasing and continuous and strictly increasing, respectively. Moreover,
the RHS takes its minimum value zero for Vn2 ! n2 and we have
36 G. LIANGETAL.
 at B
odleian Library on July 6, 2013
http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
lim
Vn2!1
E½n1 max
(
eðrSr
Þt, eðrSr
Þ2t
 P inf
tn1<stn
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn1
 )Vn2
 P inf
tn2<stn1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVn2
 
¼ eðrsrÞ2t > 1
since r < rS by Assumption 1. Hence, there must exist a unique solution to
the above equation. For any 1  i  n 2, we have
1 ¼ E½max
(
eðrSr
Þt, erS 2t P inf
tiþ1<stiþ2
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jViþ1
 
 E emax Riþ2,RSiþ2
	 

ðni2ÞtjViþ1
 )
 iþ1jVi
 P inf
ti<stiþ1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVi
 
:
By backward induction, the RHS is a strictly increasing and continuous
function in Vi with minimum value zero and maximum value greater than
one for Vi !1. Thus, there must exist a unique solution to Equation (17).
To prove the last statement, note that the RHS of the above equation
always takes its minimum value for Vi ¼ i. Thus, it is straightforward from
the above that the bank run barrier is always higher than the insolvency
barrier at the same rollover date.
A.1.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The derivations of DLðtÞ and DSðtÞ directly follow from the derivation of
PDtotal. Therefore, we only prove the sample path property of DSðtÞ. Since
RSi is measurable with respect to Vi, it is obvious that
lim
t"ti
DSðtÞ ¼ DSi :
On the other hand, by the recursive computation of the bank run barrier
in Theorem 1 (compare also with Equation (15)), we have
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DSi,þ ¼ lim
t#ti
DSðtÞ
¼ erðTtiÞS0erStiþ1E emaxfRSiþ1,Riþ1gðTtiþ1ÞjVi
h i
P inf
ti<stiþ1
ðVðsÞ  ðsÞÞ  0jVi
 
¼ erðTtiÞS0erStieRSi ðTtiÞ=i:
ðA:2Þ
Therefore, if short-term creditors roll over their debt, the expected debt
value is DSi,þ  i, and if they run on the firm, the debt value is determined by
the outside return for the remaining time period ½ti,T. As short-term cred-
itors will choose the maximal return, the expected debt value at time ti is
given by
DSi ¼ max erðTtiÞS0erStieR
S
i ðTtiÞ, erðTtiÞS0erStieR

i ðTtiÞ
n o
¼ max iDSi,þ, erðTtiÞS0erStieR

iþ1ðTtiÞ
n o
,
ðA:3Þ
which completes the proof.
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